Overeducation and Social Generations:

Welfare Regimes and Inter Cohort Inequalities in Return to Education: ¹

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This paper presents a comparative theory and an empirical analysis of intercohort inequalities in terms of economic opportunities and of returns to education. It focuses on the consequences of economic slow down in different models of welfare regimes and analyses how discontinuities in economic trends could have diverse responses in terms of balance between birth cohorts. We will analyze how these changes could configure divergent birth-cohort life chances, and, in fine, could create different conditions for the emergence of social generations (Mannheim, 1928).

A comparative theory of welfare regime-specific responses to economic fluctuations based on Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typologies will offer a general frame to the analysis of inter-cohort inequalities both in terms of cohort opportunities and life chances, and in terms of valorization of education. A set of methodological tools is presented and tested on the French case, which appear as an extreme case of strong inter-cohort inequalities and social generation fractures. Finally, an empirical comparison of four countries (DK FR IT US, based on the Luxembourg Income Study data) will be about to show how different welfare regimes could have contrasted responses in terms
of distribution of economic resources to birth cohorts, and could valorize differently their educational investments.

The main result is that the conservative (FR) and the familialistic (IT) welfare regimes are marked by strong inter-cohort inequalities to the expense of young social generations, when the social-democrat (DK) and the liberal (US) ones show less inter-cohort redistribution of resources; concerning education, if there is no clear decline in the return to education in these later countries, the former ones show strong decrease in the value of intermediate levels of education. This means the contemporary paths in social change diverged significantly, and we already have to anticipate the long term consequences of these divergences.

**Different responses of welfare regimes to economic stresses**

In previous research analyses (Chauvel, 2006 for a France-United-States comparison), I have shown the differences between the France and the American responses to economic downturn of the 1970’. The scope was to examine the concept of “social generation” as it relates to the analysis of the distribution of well-being, and to compare American and French welfare regime dynamics. The French case is marked by strong generational imbalances: in the context of economic fluctuations from the “Trente glorieuses” (1945-1975) to the “Croissance ralentie” (1975-today), I have shown the existence in France of a generational rift (“fracture générationnelle”) between the generations born before 1955 (the early baby boom generations and the previous ones, who benefited most from the economic acceleration of the postwar period) and those born after 1955 (who are facing an economic slowdown, high youth unemployment, and the resulting social problems). Thus we find an “insiderization” of previous generations and an “outsiderization” of new ones. That “fracture
"générationnelle" is often denied by policymakers and in the public debate; however, the long-term implications of these generational dynamics could have major consequences for the stability of our welfare state. Furthermore, if we have noticed in France the emergence of strong intercohort inequalities at the expense of young adults, the American answer to the same stresses (economic slow down and increasing competition) has been different: if intercohort inequalities are less visible, an increase in intracohort inequality is obvious. However, when we include the problem of education and its returns in socio-economic terms, the contrast between France and the US is clear: for intermediate levels of education (end of secondary school or short tertiary), we measure in France a strong cohort decline in the return to education (with the same level of education and with the same age or experience, new birth cohorts find lower positions in the socioeconomic hierarchy than the previous ones), when in the US the changes are quite unclear.

My aim here is to generalize these results and develop this framework to an international comparison based on the Esping-Andersen (1990) trilogy of welfare regimes, completed by the post-Ferrara (1996) controversy, since I include the fourth Mediterranean “familialistic” model. My argument is that in the intrinsic logics of different welfare regimes, the probable set of socioeconomic responses to contemporary common challenges or stresses (economic slow down, social distortions in the face of globalization, obsolescence of unqualified or industrially-qualified labor, etc.) could be significantly different. As a clue to these differences, we notice strong cohort specific “scarring effects” in France and in Italy, when they are unclear in Nordic countries and almost non-existent in the Anglo-Saxon or liberal welfare regimes. We propose here a welfare regime based theory of comparative differences in inter-cohort inequalities, in intra cohort changes in stratification, and in terms of return to intermediate levels of education. Here, in this paper, the empirical aspect of
intracohort inequality will be less developed, even if the results are interesting for the academic debate on life course and welfare regimes (see Mayer, 2005, p.34).

The theoretical aspect of this comparative analyses of welfare regime responses to economic fluctuation is based on the standard Esping-Andersen’s typology of Welfare regimes (1999). Four regimes are presented here: respectively the corporatist (or conservative), liberal, universalist (or social democrat) and familialistic ones. Which are the ideal-typical responses of these regimes to economic downturn in terms of youth opportunities, protection of different age groups, and in terms of return to education?

- Since it is based on long term fidelity of employees and on the recognition of institutionalized social rights of protected social groups, the probable response of the corporatist regime (including France) to economic slow down, international competition and economic shortage of the Welfare regime as such (as a redistributive agency, as a ruler of the labor force, and as an employer), will be a more expensive protection of insiders (stable workforce with higher seniority and high rates of trade-union memberships) at the expense of young adults leaving education, women and immigrants, who have less opportunities to defend their interests. Youth unemployment results from the scarcity of (decent) jobs in the labor market: the lack of investment in new job, the impossibility to enter in competition with protected insiders, and the resulting exacerbation of intra-cohort competition of the young for obtaining rare positions generates a decline in wages, and specific renegotiations and retrenchments of social rights of the new social generations. If seniors are victims of early retirement, they benefit also from better protections of incomes and opportunities to access comfortable pensions schemes and/or acceptable conditions of pre-retirement (better than the usual unemployment schemes of younger adults). The social
generations of seniors are more equal (in intra-cohort terms) because they are the homogeneous cohorts of the “wage earner society” (Castel, 2003) of the Golden period of 1960s’-1980s’ (seniors’ intracohort inequality declines), with better pensions schemes developed for all (seniors relative income increases); conversely, the new cohorts of adults face a stronger polarization between winners and losers (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Bell and al., 2007). Another aspect is the declining value of education. Because of massive risks of unemployment, the young and the families prefer longer education, in a system which is massively subsidized by the State: it means a massive increase in the access to (postsecondary) education of young cohorts (Van De Velde, 2008) working in tandem with a lack of improvement in labour market entry. As a consequence, the young cohorts face a trend of strong educational inflation defined by a decline in the nominal value of grades, particularly for the less selective ones (Duru Bellat, 2006), when elder cohorts remain protected against this inflation because they are not in competition with the new ones.

- The liberal regime (including the United States) is characterized by another probable answer to the same challenges: because of the centrality of market in this regime, the response to economic shortage is Welfare State retrenchments, limitation of redistributions to worse-off populations, stronger market competition, dismantlement of former social rights considered as rent-economy devices and as distortions for market equilibrium. The logics therefore is a strengthening competition between juniors and seniors (who have less intangible rights), in order to renegotiate seniors’ better positions previously obtained in the context of affluence. The consequence is smoother inter-cohort inequality (the new cohorts benefit relative to the seniors). However, strengthening competition means stronger intra-cohort inequalities. In terms of educational value, no clear change is expected for different
reasons: first, lifelong education is more usual than in Continental Europe and there are less cohort contrasts in terms of educational investment; second, since education is a costly semi-private investment, the returns to education are more stable since the investment would decline if returns weaken; third, because of stronger intercohort competition, there is no strong contrasts in the value of grades across cohorts.

- The universalistic regime (including Finland) is defined by a collective scope for long term stability, progress and development for all, with a strong sense of collective responsibility. The quality of integration of newer cohorts is then considered as a priority, since a failure in the early socialization of young adults is clearly seen as a massive problem for future development of society. Strong rates of youth unemployment and economic devalorization of young adults could go with long term risks of anxiety, sentiment of self devaluation of the young, increasing suicide rates or decline in the fertility index: the social cost of a failure in the process of integration and socialization of the young is seen as unacceptable. More generally, a better control of social risks over the complete life course is a central dimension of the Nordic Welfare state model. It means that important changes in intercohort inequalities are about to be collectively controlled and balanced by public policies. In terms of education, the global context of competition and massive pressure on lower and now intermediate levels of skills, the problem of old age and the necessity to maintain elders in the workforce in better conditions, all these constraints request a better distribution of qualifications on the life course and an effort of flexicurity shared by individuals and the collectivity. The consequence is a stronger control, relatively to the two previous models, of both intra- and inter-cohort inequalities. In terms of value of education, the collective control on education (balance between public investment and subsidization of education but
incentives to avoid overeducation) avoid major changes in the scarcity/abundance of levels of grades. Like in the Liberal regime, flexicurity and policies of inter-job mobility reduce the contrasts between age groups, avoid excessive protections of some cohorts at the expense of others, and limits situations of cohort-rents.

- **The familialistic regime** (including Italy) shares many aspects of the corporatist one, but families are here a legitimate institution in the process of re-distribution of resources, both culturally and for the regulatory activities of the State. More precisely, in this regime, some sectors of the economy are strongly protected (mainly the core sectors of the public economy and of large private companies such as banks, insurance, etc.) and most of the labor regulations there are based on seniority rights; in most middle and small size companies, the regulation is based notably on family interconnections, where both localism and long term fidelity of workers are fundamental institutions. In the context of post-affluent societies, and of scarcity of jobs, housing and other resources, parents of young adults are supposed to offer help and protection, and most families act in conformity with these social pressures. The consequence is a trend of increasing dependence of young adults till age 35 (or even beyond) in a context of declining levels of wages and standard of living for the cohorts of new entrants into the labor market. Consequently seniors exert a political pressure to obtain better pensions, in order to support their own children. The context of economic dependency generates stronger constraints for young families, increases the social pressures on women to choose between work and children, and is accompanied by a strong decline in the fertility rates, which creates a paradoxical context of “familialism without families”, and becomes a major problem in the long term sustainability of the pensions and Welfare regime (shorter and less affluent careers of juniors, generational collapse of one children families, etc.).
Conversely, the decline of incomes for young families is offset by the reduction of family size. In this regime, the national homogeneity may be weaker compared to other regimes since the inter-provincial imbalances (strong unemployment rates in some localities could go with a lack of appropriate workforce in others) are structural traits of a labor market where localism and strong ties are important aspects of social regulations, implying less geographic mobility. Another dimension is a strong development of mass tertiary education, which generates a strong trend towards overeducation: dependant young adults having parents with poor family interconnections and social capital (parents who can not find a job for their children) continue education later and later, sometimes in sectors where the job market for educated young adults is quite narrow. As a result, unemployment rates by level of education could be flat or even increasing. Such a dynamic could create a strong decline in the value of diploma.

While the welfare regime logics and transformations are central issues, other factors could influence these results. These include:

- economic acceleration: even in the short term, a better economic situation could diminish pressure for welfare retrenchments;

- quality of the transition from school to work: close relations between the educational system and the labor market, organized internships, strong network of alumni, etc. limit the risk of “outsiderization” of young adults;

- shape of demography: a boom in fertility rates may generate 20 or 25 years later a phenomenon of “overcrowding” in the labor market (Easterlin, 1961; Easterlin and al., 1993).
The combinations of these factors are much more complex than expected. Because of the diversity of potential configurations, we should expect that the welfare regime explanation outlined here is only a part of the real history of each nation. While the welfare regime offers strong constraints, historical ascribed configurations (demography, level of development and opportunities for growth, etc.) and achievements of social policies (educational booms, structural reforms on the labor market, etc.) could also be important explanatory factors.

**Definitions and tools of generational research**

The use of “generations” in European social science is more permissive than in the American academic context: for American sociologists, “generation” refers to the sociology of kinship and to family issues, while “cohort” (or “birth cohort”) refers to people born in the same year (Ryder, 1965). Therefore, in American academic journals, the expression “social generation” is quite uncommon (except in the discussions of Karl Mannheim’s theories). If some economists in the American tradition (Easterlin, 1966; Auerbach et al. 1994) write about “generations” and “generational accounting”, the birth cohorts they consider are also engaged in kinship relations of generational transmissions (gifts, education, legacy, etc.). The European tradition is different: here (Mentré, 1922; Mannheim, 1929) “social generation” is defined as specific groups of cohorts exposed to a common pattern of social change and/or sharing collective identity features such as ethnicity, gender, or class.

Historically, four definitions of “generation” exist (Mentré, 1922). The first one is less important to our argument: genealogical generations pertain to the sociology of family and kinship. The three others relate respectively to demographic, social and historic generations. A demographic generation is identical to a “birth cohort”: the group of individuals born in the same year. This is the
most neutral clustering criterion that assumes no common trait. Conversely, the *historical generation* is a set of cohorts defined by a common culture, shared interests, consciousness of the generation’s specificity and its historical role, and occasionally conflict with other generations. A historical generation may define itself by the time of its coming of age in history: a decisive example is the so-called “*génération 1968*”, which refers to the first cohorts of the baby-boom (born between 1945 and 1950). The “*génération 1914*”, the generation of young adults of the First World War, is another dramatic example. *Social generation* is then defined as a link between these two polar definitions. In the empirical social sciences, we first look at demographic generations, and then we define historical generations from the results of sociological analysis, assessment and interpretation of the diversity or homogeneity of cohorts, as well as their objective and subjective identities and consciousness.

First we must look at “socialization” in general, without delving into a systematic theorization. During youth, between the end of school and the stabilization of adulthood, there is a specific period of “transitional socialization”, which is a pivotal point in the formation of individuals’ choices for the future: in a short period, usually some months, the potentialities offered by family and education turn into concrete positions from which people will construct their life courses. That individual process has collective consequences when a cultural or historical polarization has a “socialization effect” on most individual members of the new generation (Mannheim, 1929).

For people at age 20, collective historical experiences such as May 1968 or July 1914 could form durable opportunities or scars, since they face a major transition in their lives within a dramatic social or historical context. Children cannot completely participate yet, and older people could be less affected, since they are already influenced by other experiences accumulated in other historical contexts (Ryder, 1965). This “transitional socialization” is not necessarily sufficient to create or
promote durable generational traits: they need a continuous process of collective recall to reinforce the social generation’s identity that would progressively vanish otherwise (Becker, 2000).

A major problem in generational social change analysis is the intersection of three social times: age, period and cohort. The most common time is “period” and pertains to the succession of historical epochs; the second time relates to “age” and the aging process; the third one is the *time of generations*, which consists of the continuous process of replacement of elder cohorts by new ones. These three times are organized in a two-dimensional plane (see Figure 1) that implies a profound indeterminacy. In any given period, different age groups coexist (defined by age thresholds, age statuses and roles), but they also represent different generations who have been socialized in different historical contexts. When we compare different age groups at a given date (period), we cannot know *a priori* whether their differences result from age or from generation: in year 2008, on the Lexis diagram, if the age group at age 60 (born in 1948) is at the top of income scale, we do not know whether it is an age effect (any cohort will enjoy better income at age 60) or a cohort effect (the 1948 cohort has faced the best career opportunities of the 20th century since its entry into the labor market). Age-period-cohort models have been developed to reveal generation effects, which can be discerned when specific traits appear in the “life line” of specific cohorts (Mason and *al.* 1973).

*Figure 1 Lexis diagram*
Note: the Lexis diagram offers a synthetic view of the interactions of social times: when we cross periods, horizontally, and age, vertically, the time of cohorts appears on the diagonal \( (a = p - c) \). In year \( p = 2009 \), people at age 61 are born in 1948; they were 20 in 1968. At each period, young and old age groups are also different birth cohorts for whom socialization occurred in different contexts: the 75-year-old age group of 2009 (born in 1935) is also the “welfare generation” that has had abundant access to public pensions and health systems, while the same age group in period 1968 was the remains of the “sacrificed generation” born in 1894 (20 year old in 1914).

It is possible to mobilize Mannheim’s theory of early adulthood socialization, where the newer generation, which has just experienced its transitional socialization, is generally reacting strongly to new trends. In periods of sudden social change, the newer cohorts are the most influenced by the discontinuities of history because they are the first to experience the new contexts of socialization that previous cohorts could not anticipate and in which they do not participate (Mead, 1970). More precisely, during an economic acceleration, the young generation of adults generally do better than older ones because they can move easily to better positions; conversely, during an economic slowdown, the newcomers are generally more fragile because they have less room in the social structure, and no past accumulation of human or social capital, nor do they possess social rights to smooth the downward shock they face. We can expect such fluctuations in the distribution of well-being by cohorts, with a succession of “sacrificed” and “elect” generations emerging over time; and
if the effect of socialization is strong and durable, each generation retains the consequences of its
difficult or favorable entry. These fluctuations in the distribution of well-being before any
redistribution could correspond to even stronger inequalities after redistribution, since the
generations marked by prosperity tend to accumulate larger contributive social rights than the
generations marked by deprivation.

The multidimensional “fracture générationnelle” in France

In terms of inter cohort inequalities, France is empirically an extreme model of clear visibility of the
phenomenon. In France, convergent evidence shows how the economic slowdown has provoked a
dramatic multidimensional “fracture générationnelle” since the late 1970s (Chauvel, 1998; 2002:
“preface”; 2003). This portrait is grim, but it is founded on strong empirical bases, and alternative
sets of microdata offering convergent results, confirmed by various authors (Baudelot et Establet,
2000, Koubi 2003, Peugny, 2007). Three principal topics will be highlighted here: first, the
economic marginalization of new entrants into the labor market and its direct effects on social
structure; second, the long-term consequences of this deprivation in terms of socialization and life
chances; and finally, we develop shortly the consequences in terms of life styles or political
participation.

The economic decline of youth

The first aspect of the dynamics of social generation in France is the change in the cohort
distribution of economic means. A large redistribution of earnings and incomes occurred between
the seventies and today. In 1977, the earnings gap between age groups 30-35 and 50-55 was 15%;
the gap is now about 40%. During the “Trente glorieuses”, the young wage earners generally began
in the labor market with the same level of income as their own parents at the end of a complete career. For the last twenty years, we have observed the stagnation of the wages of the young while wages for older people have grown by 20% or more. Here is a new difference between age groups, whose consequences are not completely understood by contemporary social sciences. But it is not simply a change on the relative position of age groups: members of the elder generation (now, those at age 55, more or less) were relatively advantaged in their youth when compared to their seniors, and now, too, when these seniors are compared their young successors. The generational gaps result from double gains and double pains.

How could we explain this increasing gap? In fact, this is a consequence of a changing collective compromise, which occurred happened during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. This transition in the social value of generations brought from a relative valorization of newer generations, as a positive future we had to invest in, to a relative valorization of the protection of the adults’ and seniors’ stability, even at the expense of the young. The main factor in the redistribution of well-being concerned unemployment. High unemployment rates were socially acceptable for young workers, provided that adult employees with dependent children could avoid these difficulties. In 1974, the unemployment rate of those who left school 24 months before or less was about 4%; by 1985, those who left school recently had an unemployment rate of 35%, which remained the case through 1996; in 2002, at the end of the recent wave of economic recovery, it was close to 18%. The unemployment rates of recent school leavers are strongly reactive to the economic situation whereas the middle-aged and senior rates remain more stable: an economic slowdown has serious consequences for younger adults, and recovery first benefits new entrants in the labor market. Evidently, the perverse consequence of that collective compromise for the protection of adults at the expense of newcomers is the lack of socialization of the new sacrificed generations: even if they are
now adults, with dependent children of their own, their unemployment rates remain much higher, and their earnings abnormally low when compared to other age groups, because of a kind of “scarring effect”. At the end of the eighties, the unemployment rate of the group at age 40 to 44 was still about 4% and is now over 8%. The age compromise for the protection of adults with dependent children is unclear now. This “scarring effect” is even clearer concerning earnings: the cohorts of new entrants in the labor market in a time of downturn have to accept lower wages; conversely, for young workers, a strong economy allows them to negotiate better earnings. After this entry point, the earning gaps remains because of the lack of catch up effect on earnings (Chauvel, 2003, chap. 3): some generations are about 10 points above or below the long-term trend, because of the point at which they entered the workforce, and after age 30, the relative benefit or handicap remains stable.

A complementary factor relates to the dynamics of occupational structure and the stratification system. In France as in the US (Mendras, 1988; Bell, 1973), the standard hypothesis of stratification change suggests that the long-term educational expansion of the twentieth century, and the emergence of a knowledge-based society, have stimulated the enlargement of the middle and upper middle classes; thus, the newer generation could have mechanically benefited from the expansion of the occupational groups of experts, managers or professionals (“cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures”, in French3), to whom we often add middle management and lower professionals in the private and public sectors (such as school teachers and nurses), who exemplify the “new technical middle class”, whose social hegemony was predicted in the seventies (“professions intermédiaires” in the official French nomenclature of occupations).

Figure 2a “Cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures” plus “Professions intermédiaires” in two age groups
At the aggregated level, the expansion of these middle and higher occupational groups in France seems to be a demonstration of that idea: for the aggregated age group between 30 and 54, the rise is from 12.5% in 1970 to 31.5% of the total population (Figure 2a and b). However, when we make a distinction between age groups, the dynamics are much more complicated: at age 30, the percentage of those in middle and higher white collar occupational groups jumped from 13% to 24% from 1964 to 1975, and reached 26% in 1980. In the earlier period, the trend strongly accelerated for these “juniors”, but stalled after 1980: a 4-points increase in the two decades between 1980 and 2000, compared to a 11-point increase from 1964 to 1975.

Figure 2b “Cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures” plus “Professions intermédiaires” in two age groups / cohort diagram
In the middle of the “Trente glorieuses”, France experienced a dramatic expansion of the public sector and high-tech large companies (Airbus, France Télécom, civil nuclear electricity planning, health system, universities and research centers, etc.), creating strong demand for highly qualified employees with higher education. The first cohorts of the baby-boom (the 1945 cohort, which was 30 years old in 1975) were surely not a sacrificed generation since they enjoyed longer education in the context of a dynamic labor market, and did not face the diminishing returns to education that subsequent cohorts have faced. In 2000, 25 years later, the portion of 30-year-old in mid-level and higher white-collar occupational groups is quite similar and stable (26%), compared to 23% in 1975 and 24.5% in 1980. In this respect, the cohort born in 1970 knows no clear progress. However, during the 1990s, the expansion for “seniors” (that is, the “juniors” of the seventies) is obvious.
Thus, the expansion of mid-level and higher occupational groups’ across generations is not linear. The apparent linear growth results from the inappropriate aggregation of a strong expansion — for the early baby-boomers — and of a strong slowdown for the succeeding generations.

**Figure 3 Relative income (RADI) 1979-2005 by age group**

Source: LISproject microdata, plus Budget des ménages 2000-2005 for the lastest period. Relative adjusted disposable income (RADI); Radi = 1 relates to the 30 to 64 year old average of the period; periods 1, 2, 3, 4 relates to LIS data around 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000. On the figure, age 30 pertain to the group aged 30 to 34. Population : any individuals characterized by their household’s radi.

When we shift from occupations to incomes (**figure 3**), the findings are similar: whereas the standards of living (here in terms of disposable incomes after taxes and benefits per consumption unit, relatively to the national average) were comparable or even flat from age 25 to 55, there is now a huge contrast between age 30 and age 50. These age transformations hide stable long term inter cohort inequalities.
Scarring effect

These evolutions would have had no significant social impact if, for the new generations, these early difficulties had no permanent effect. If the new entrants in the labor force in a period of scarcity could catch up from their early difficulties later in their lives, the problem would be anecdotal or residual. The assessment of the long-term impact of these early difficulties is central to the interpretation; if young, deprived generations do not catch up, a kind of long-term hysteresis effect appears that we can call a “scar” or “scarring effect”, since the handicap seems definitive. The age-period-cohort analysis shows that cohorts who experienced a difficult (favorable) entry because of a context of recession (expansion), continue to suffer (benefit) from a relative delay (advancement) in upward mobility when they are compared to the average situation. The relative position of a collective cohort at age 30 is rapidly crystallized, and there does not appear to be a substantial catch-up effect later on (Figure 2b). How can we explain the lack of a generational catch-up dynamics? Those who had benefited from a period of entry marked by a strong demand for skilled jobs experienced faster career and earlier labor experience at higher levels of responsibility, with better wages; these individuals (and the cohort they constitute at an aggregated level) retain the long term benefits of the early opportunities they enjoyed, which will positively influence their future trajectory at any later age.

For those who entered the labor market under difficult economic conditions, the periods of unemployment they faced, the necessity to accept less qualified jobs with lower wages, and the consecutive delays in career progression, imply negative stimuli for their own trajectories (decline in ambition, lack of valued work experiences) and could appear as a negative signal for future potential employers. The hypothesis we present here for France is that cohort-specific socialization contexts imply long-term opportunities and life chances for individuals and for their cohorts; when the
difficulties disappear, the cohorts who faced these problems continue to suffer from long-term consequences of past handicaps.

In more concrete terms, the cohorts born during the forties, who benefited from the economic acceleration of the late sixties, were relatively privileged compared to the previous cohorts when young, and are relatively advantaged when compared to the newer ones, because of the lack of progress for the young from 1975 to the present. We can generalize this observation: the cohorts who entered the labor force after 1975 and experienced an economic slump and mass unemployment, have been the early victims of the new generational dynamics, and they retain the long-term scars of their initial difficulties in the labor market.

An important point we cannot develop at length here is the consequences of educational expansion. If the level of education has increased in the cohorts born in 1950 to 1975, that positive trend was accompanied by a strong social devalorization of grades (Chauvel, 2000). More specifically, the first cohorts of the baby boom have benefited from an expansion of education at a time when the rewards to education remained stable: even if there were twice as many Baccalauréat recipients in the 1948 cohort than in the 1935 one, their likelihood of access to higher social or economic positions did not shrink. On the other hand, the generations that followed had to deal with a strong trend of devaluation in terms of the economic and social returns to education. The first consequence is a rush to the most valued and selective grades (in the “Grandes écoles” of the elite such as Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Sciences-Po Paris, etc.) whose value remains stable, but whose population becomes more and more specific and may be discriminatory in terms of social origins. The second consequence is a strong devalorization of less prestigious universities, which are less exclusive but have much smaller per capita endowments in comparison to the Grandes écoles. In the same way, the best secondary schools become more selective, with major
consequences in terms of urban segregation. In the French case, the school system was traditionally
the central institution of the Republic and at the heart of its idea of Progress, providing the strongest
support for French-style social democracy and meritocracy. The collapse of the value of intermediate
level grades (figure 4) implies a destabilization of this myth and a pessimistic outlook on progress,
developments that we can expect to have political consequences.

Now that we are nearing the end of this long-term slowdown, which began 25 years ago, we can
compare two social and genealogical generations. For the first time in a period of peace, the youth
of the new generation are not better off than their parents at the same age. In fact, the “1968
generation”, born in 1948, are the children of those born in 1918 who were young adults in World
War II, and who worked in difficult conditions at the beginning of the “Trente glorieuses”. The
condition of the baby boomers was incomparably better than their parents’. But the following
genealogical generation, born around 1978 — that is now between 25 and 30 years old — faces
diminished opportunities of growth, not only because of an economic slump, but also because of
their relatively poor outcomes in comparison to those of their own parents, who did very well.

We now observe rising rates of downward social mobility connected to the proliferation of middle
class children who can not find social positions comparable to their parents’. This déclassement
social goes with a strong effect of déclassement scolaire, say a decline, regularly from a cohort to
the next one, of the social prestige of occupations corresponding to a given level of education. The
cohort analysis of this decline shows that cohorts born before 1950 are not participating to this
déclassement scolaire since they enjoyed high statuses at age 25, and continue now to benefit from
it. The cohorts facing lower positions at age 25 are almost unable to catch up early difficulties on the
labor market. An important aspect is the cohort-impermeability of the process: those who acquired
their statuses in better situations are able to retain their early advantages when the others show no clear resilience after their entry on the labor market.

**Figure 4 Educational inflation**: % of Baccalaureat holders (and no more = validation of the end of secondary education) accessing higher or lower service class positions (*cadres et professions intermédiaires*) by age group

![Diagram showing educational inflation over time.](image)


Consequently, France offers an ideal typical example of problematic dynamics of a corporatist regime, since it is unable to distribute its benefits to young adults, since it sacrifices the interests of large fractions of its population and since it is unable to organize its own transmission to newer generations. We are about to speak about lack of intergenerational sustainability, since such welfare regimes support social rights of former cohort generations and deprive the next generations from its benefits.
**Is France an exception? An international comparison of cohorts**

This case is very interesting, indeed, since we have with France a country presenting specific traits, on many respects. France is defined by an homogeneous culture, notably by a political culture of refusal of market rules, is homogeneously governed by a centralized system of governance about to produce for long periods the same erroneous diagnoses and decisions on the totality of the territory, is based on a culture of stop-and-go policies of alternate periods of excessive investments and of scarcity, about to create backlashes and counter-backlashes. France is also a country where the first years on the labor market are strategic for future life-chances of individuals: early successes or early failures become respectively positions of rent or conversely lifelong handicaps. France could be an exception about to experience exceptional intercohort inequalities. More decentralized countries (like the United States or Italy) could blur these fractures; more responsible political regimes could avoid stop and go policies or accept more rapidly the diagnosis of previous mistakes, and act to balance them. Societies where life course is characterized by more instability or by less conservative processes than in France, could be more propitious to redistribution of opportunities between cohorts.

A solution to test this idea of a possible French exceptionalism is to compare the dynamics of incomes on the life course in contrasted nations. Four countries will be considered here: France, Italy, Finland and the United States. This choice gives one country by typical esping-andersenerian welfare regime. The four countries are characterized by (approximately) similar level of development and the trends are roughly parallel, even if the American economy was the first to stagnate in the 1970 and if its behavior was somehow better during the 1990’s.

The four selected countries pertain to samples of microdata available in the *Luxembourg Income Study Project* ([www.lisproject.org](http://www.lisproject.org)), but other typical countries could have been selected with
consistent results. Since in this paper the major concern is about consumption, the focus will be on household level standards of living and not on personal earnings: here we focus less on economic rewards to occupations than on “life chances” in terms of access of different cohorts to commodities. The LIS project data offers the possibility to compute adjusted disposable income (total net income after taxes and transfers, adjusted by household size, where the equivalence scale is the square-root of the number of residents of the household) in order to compare the living standards of age groups at four different periods, respectively around 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000.

The main results of the comparison of the Relative adjusted disposable income (RADI, Figure 5) are:

- in 2000, the shapes of the age distribution of the average RADI are similar with an ascending slope to age 55 and a declining standard of living after (decline of earnings or retirement).

- from 1985 to 2000, except in the United States, we note a general increase of the senior’s income, more modest in Finland and very significant in France;

**Figure 5 Relative adjusted disposable income (RADI) by age group for 3 periods**

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Source: LISproject microdata, the author’s calculation. Relative adjusted disposable income (RADI); Radi = 1 relates to the 30 to 64 year old average of the period; periods 1, 2, 3, 4 relates to LIS data around 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000. On the figure, age 30 pertain to the group aged 30 to 34. Population: any individuals characterized by their household’s radi.

- France and Italy are characterized by a strong relative decline of the age group 35 to 39; the French dynamics pertain to a very clear cohort wave (there is a progressive shift of age at maximum income from age 40 to age 50);
• In Italy, the decline of RADI at age 30 is less significant, but note that at age 30 most Italians are not head of their own household, and most of them continue to nominally benefit from the affluence of their own seniors.

The main point is that France and Italy show profound redistributions of living standards to the profit of seniors and at the expense of younger mid-aged adults, when Finland and the United States face no massive transformations (the relative consequences of the slight improvement for Finnish seniors is shared by all the other age groups). When both the Nordic and Liberal welfare regimes are about to smoothen intercohort inequalities, the corporatist and the familialistic regimes generate visible imbalances between age groups, the age groups relating to the part of the life course when young families appear are marked by profound transformations.

In France, when the gap in 1985 between the 55 year old and the 35 year old age group was – 15%, the gap is +16% in 2000, and we have a redistribution of 31 points; in Italy, the numbers are respectively –8% and +22%, with a redistribution of 30 points. These implicit redistributions between age groups are not negligible: here is the evidence of the stability of both the Nordic and the Liberal regimes in terms of intercohort inequality and of the strong intercohort inequalities created inside both the corporatist and the familialistic regimes.

If the intercohort inequality dynamics affect different shapes inside the different welfare regimes, intracohort inequality matters too. In terms of contrasts between the top and the bottom of the standard of living distribution, the cohorts dynamics matter. We measure here the intracohort inequality with the interdecile ratio D9/D1, the ratio between the income of the richest 10% and the income of the poorest 10% (Figure 6).
The most noticeable results are:

Source: LISproject microdata, the author’s calculation. See previous figure. Periods 1, 2, 3, 4 relates to LIS data around 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000.
• The spectrum of inequality measures is well known: the United States is the most unequal country with Finland being the most equal; Italy is closer to the United States and France to Finland.

• In Finland, the situation is stable.

• In France, we have a decline in seniors’ inequality: in the eighties, the older, the stronger the intracohort inequality, and the former older cohorts has been replaced by younger ones which are more equalitarian, but the youngest cohort do not improve their degree of intracohort equality.

• The United States faces stronger intracohort inequality for seniors (the young being more egalitarian, and inequalities seeming to increase with age), and this structure of increasing inequalities of elders is increasing (the contrast between juniors and seniors is deeper nowadays).

• Italy is more unstable, but younger cohorts face stronger intracohort inequality in 2000 than in the mid-1980’s, when it is the opposite at age 50. Relatively poorer (figure5) and more unequal, and dynamically facing pauperization and increasing inequality, the younger Italian cohorts are visibly challenged. Moreover, a deeper analysis (Chauvel 2007) shows that these elements are even more severe when we include a demographic argument: the situation of young Italian adults is difficult but their answer to this challenge has been a decline in their fertility: less children mean higher standards of living (because the income is shared between less consumption units). If the fertility rate of contemporary young adults remained unchanged when compared to the 1980’s, their economic difficulty would be even stronger.
In France, and in Italy, the conditions and the standards of living of younger cohorts are destabilized: the young experience dynamics which are significantly less propitious than their elders’. It means a rupture in the welfare regime which is not sustainable, since the socialization of newer cohorts differ from that of previous cohorts, at the expense of newer cohorts.

At the opposite, no radical changes appear in both the Finnish and the American dynamics: here are stable welfare regimes with no clear rupture in the process of socialization of different cohorts. The strong social protection in Finland remains a collective good shared by all age groups, and the American inegalitarian system remains almost the same on the period 1985-2000 (but if we come back to the previous period of “reaganomics”, the rupture of regime was obvious, but is now a question of long term historical change).

**Welfare regime and return to education**

“Grade inflation” is defined here as the decline in the nominal value of grades, in terms of access to income, that new cohorts experience, in comparison to the achievements of elder cohorts at the same age. It does not simply mean that younger are in lower position than elder, since it could be simple a life course effect. More subtly, it is no more a simple shared downward shift shared in parallel by all age groups, because it could be the result of a long term trend of diffusion of grades: but if this downward shift is equally shared, there is no specific downturn for younger birth cohorts. Then we search specific patterns of lack of parallelism in the changes by age groups. We focus here on the intermediate levels of education (validation of the end of secondary education, and no more), which are known to
be more responsive to effects of diffusion of education, in France notably (Duru-Bellat, 2006). Thus we are here on the assessment of the consequence of the diffusion of grades on the mid-educated lower middle class. Moreover, to have a comparable scale across years and countries on a relatively long term, we analyze the average position of this mid-educated group compared to the average national population of the considered period. The idea of grade inflation goes with the hypothesis that the average mid-educated population, compared to the total population, is declining from period to period and from older to younger cohorts; but for the purpose of these intercohort comparison, we are more interested in non linear or at least non parallel changes. Which are the main results?

- Everywhere, from the first period to the last one (mid-1980’s to around 2000), and from the oldest to the youngest age groups, we measure a dynamics of decline in the relative position of the mid-educated group compared to the average population. On the long term, it results from a mathematical relation: the larger the mid-educated group, the lower its relative positions to the total average. In this long term dynamics, new young age groups ever arrive too late, but they will be followed by even younger about to be even closer to the bottom.

- However, the most important elements resides in the non linear or non parallel evolutions. The French case is typical: there, the older age groups maintain or increase the relative value of their educational position (the fifty-something of 2000 are the first cohorts of the French baby-boom, a cohort that in France enjoyed a boom in access to the end of secondary and beginning of tertiary education), when the new cohorts of thirty-something face a clear decline in their position.
Figure 7 Return to intermediate level education (end of secondary) (1= nat. median RADI)

Source: LISproject microdata, the author’s calculation. See previous figure. periods 1, 2, 3, 4 relates to LIS data around 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000.

- The American case is interesting, since the situation is quite opposite: the forty-fifty-something are experiencing a decline in their position when the younger age groups have stable position; these cohorts were the young generations of the American baby-boom which
faced a less pleasant situation than the French one (Vietnam war, entry in the economic slow
down of the late 1960’s and later). They were also the mid-aged adults of the strong reforms
of the 1980’s, and were the targets of the recompositions and downsizings of the American
industry (Newman 1999).

• In Finland, the evolutions are less visible even if the mid-aged population of the survey 2000
show a visible but modest decline.

• Italy is the most significant case where the mid-aged population face a strong decline, similar
to the observations of the figure 5: when they stay home (in the house of their parents), the
young lower-middle class Italians risk no déclassement, but when they enter adulthood as
independent workers and parents, their situation appear exceptional in the comparison. But
we have to precise that this decline hides an even deeper change since the changes in the
Italian fertility rates (with .4 children less in 15 years for the mid-ages households)
dissimulate even stronger downturn. In this case, we measure very nonlinear changes where
the issue is not a polarization between “the young” and “the seniors”, but between the last
cohorts of the affluence, which are close to retirement, and the first cohorts of the economic
slow down, which are mid-aged today.

These nonlinear changes, when they are substantial (in France and in Italy), suggest that some
cohorts are about to avoid a process of “grade inflation” that other cohorts are facing alone. These
changes show that the populations of some welfare regimes are at risk in front of stop-and-go
policies. In these countries, the contrast between close birth cohorts could become generational
fractures, objectively obvious, even if their translation in terms of social generations and of
generational conflict are not simply mechanical. Conversely, the logics of other welfare regimes (the
liberal and the social-democrat) are about to limit shocks, to soften cohort fractures and to smooth strong contrast between close age groups. It is clear the positive aspect of the social democrat regime is to maintain economic inequalities inside acceptable limits (despite their recent increase), even if other challenges exist (problems of declining social homogeneity, of responsibility and incentives to work in a very equalitarian country). The liberal regime presents more risks of conflictuality and of social difficulties connected to traditional (hierarchical) inequalities, but shows lower risks of fracture between birth cohorts than in continental Europe. In the United States, the Generation-X seems to be less specific and based on concrete situations of generations than in continental Europe.

**Welfare regime ruptures and balance between social generations**

The main conclusion is that the answers of the different welfare regimes to the economic slow down of the post 1970’s period differ substantially. The Finnish model of welfare faced the challenge with a universalistic objective of stabilization and protection of all age groups equally; the young adults are not the specific victims of any kind of retrenchments in the model. At the opposite part of the inequality spectrum, the United States did not diverge from their principle of competitive market, and both the young and elders face similar perspective of life course. In those countries, the value of education in terms of economic position is less obviously destabilized than in continental Europe.

Conversely, the French and the Italian answers to the new challenges, with a stronger protection and more affluent positions of seniors and more difficulties for the younger cohorts (lower relative income, difficulties in gaining access to economic independence and in entering the job market, and stronger inequality in Italy, and difficulties in mid-life), creates a paradoxical situation where social democracy seem to improve in the older cohorts while the younger ones are destabilized, even at age 40 when the very new generation is to appear and to socialized. There, the declining value of
education when it is compared to the socioeconomic positions of former cohorts (the déclassement scolaire) imply also a pessimistic feeling about future a strong risk of destabilization of cultural and political participation. This could explain a part of the French pessimism and the feeling expressed by young adults of a double victimization: victims of fake liberalism which give freedom to those who had the economic means, and fake socialism which has forgotten the young.

The central point of my conclusion pertains to the long-term sustainability of welfare regimes. To be stable in the long term, a social system must arrange its own reproduction from one generation to the next, and the reproduction of the capacity to create new periods. In France and in Italy, today’s seniors benefit from a large welfare state, but the vast social rights they were able to accumulate was the consequence of their relatively advantaged careers; we assert that the new generations, when they become seniors themselves, will not be able to benefit from the same rights, and the large size of the present welfare state will mechanically erode with cohort replacement, since the reproduction of the welfare regime is not ascertained.

In France, where the generational dynamics of the different social strata are parallel if not similar, the major problem is not generational inequalities, but the fact that newer generations heavily support a welfare system that could collapse before they benefit from it. The problem is not stagnation, but lack of preparation in the long-term, at the expense of the most fragile population: the young and the recently socialized generations. Here lies the problem of sustainability for the current welfare regime: it appears large, strong and durable, but its decline is almost certain; the security it offers to seniors is often at the expense of young cohorts facing radical uncertainty.

In the United States, the case is more complicated. For the young generations, the highest classes enjoy exceptionally better positions while the median classes see their fortunes stagnate and the poor are subjected to relative, if not absolute, deprivation. For the moment, this regime is stable and
seems durable. At the opposite, the Finnish one shows the high standards of protection, equality and solidarity could be inter generationally stable too, since newer cohorts benefit from similar conditions and rights than their elders.

The key questions are: will younger generation in France or in Italy continue to sustain a system where their social condition is devalued compared to the older generations, with no clear prospects of improvement? For the moment, these intergenerational inequalities are accepted, since they are generally unknown, their social visibility is low and their political recognition null. These examples of the corporatist and familialistic impasse show that if we want solidarity, there is no other way than in a universalistic model (similar to the Nordic one) which support equally the young, the mid-aged and the elders, in a long term perspective of socialization. In terms of consumption, these results give a better understanding of differences in the national life course perspective of standards of living. In France, compared to the United States, the young generation faces real difficulties, and, at the opposite, the nowadays seniors benefit from a specific economic boom and from economic homogenization (more equality); in France, seniors appear attractive targets for marketing products while the young are often framed in terms of social problems. The Italian situation is similar, but the demographic collapse of young generations of adults (less numerous with less children) and their increasing degree of familialistic dependence reduces the degree of immediate visibility of the social problem; but this problem will necessarily appear raising the questions who will care for elders? At the opposite Finland seem to be a stable model of development of a universalistic solidaristic regime of collective improvement. The social problems which appear elsewhere (deepening gap between the rich and the poor, accumulation of social problems for the newer generations, destabilization of the young educated middle class, etc.) seem to be relativized and smoothed, and the general atmosphere is more propitious to a socially homogeneous and the development of a “wage earner middle class”
in a knowledge based society. While recognizing there are limitations to the welfare regime model approach this analysis suggests the universalistic welfare regime is sustainable and maintains its own capacity for long term development.

The real problems are elsewhere. The French and the Italian cases are more problematic, with clear signs of failures in the socialization of the new generations. In this respect, we will have to extend the comparison. If Germany s about to offer more optimistic views (if we forget demography) the case of Spain could be also very interesting, with the problem of “mileuristas” (young university graduates gaining less than one thousand euros a month, and comparing their earnings to their parents, less educated but more affluent) which is of major importance for the future of social development. In many other countries, the same kind of analyses could be useful: in Argentina where public universities have offered for the last 20 years more young graduates than the economy could absorb, but also in Japan, where the post-1990 economic slow down has had for consequence a failure in the socialization of younger adults and an emergence of new social problems involving Hikikomori (ひきこもり), young eternal adolescents preferring videogames to real life, Freeters (フリーター furita) who are new cohorts of non-labor force non-students living with the support of parents, or parasite singles (パラサイトシングル parasaito shinguru) living for years or decades in the house of their parents. These problems connected with overdevelopment could be observed now in Taiwan, and even could emerge now in urban China where some young graduates of prestigious universities prefer to stay with uncertain or poor social statues in Shanghai or Beijing better to gain serious positions in middle size cities of 5 million inhabitants in continental China. This problem will be one of the most frustrating issue of old and new developed societies in the 21st century.
Notes

1 I wish to acknowledge the useful discussions, comments, help and support I received from Riitta Jallinoja, Ian Rees Jones, JP Roos, Pekka Sulkunen, Aurélie Mary, Enzo Mingione, Katherine Newman, Paul Attwell.

2 France and the United States both experienced a period of post-war affluence: the American “Golden Age of capitalism” (Maddison, 1982) and the French “Trente Glorieuses” (Fourastié, 1979), which contrast with the subsequent period of economic slowdown and “diminished expectations” (Krugman, 1992). See, notably: Chauvel, 1998 [2nd ed. 2002].

3 The French representation of the social stratification system in terms of occupation is different from the American one; the French tradition is very strong and contributes to a declining but still central “classist” vision of French society, shared by most social scientists, the media and social actors. In this respect, the contrast with the US is dramatic. See also Szreter (1993) who develops a comparative view of the difference in the representations of middle class occupational groups.

4 During the twentieth century, an average age gap of about 30 years separated parents and their children.

5 These parents are about to help their children in different ways with the intensification of “solidarités familiales” (transfers and transmissions between generations, both financial, in kind, cultural and material) that Attias-Donfut (2000) describes, but at the collective level, the first and the most efficient solidarité would consist of a redistribution of social positions.

References:


